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This article surveys significant legal developments in India during the year 2013.1
I. Changes To Company Law
On August 8, 2013, the Indian Parliament passed the Companies Bill.2 The Bill re-
ceived presidential assent on August 29, 2013, updating the half-century-old Companies
Act of 1956 (1956 Act). 3 The provisions of the Companies Act 2013 (New Act) are being
gradually phased in, and provisions requiring statutory and regulatory consultation, the
finctioning of new bodies, or the prescription of relevant rules will be effective after cer-
tain actions are completed. The 1956 Act has not been repealed, but existing provisions
that correspond to the approximately ninety-eight sections of the New Act will cease to
have effect once the new provisions become effective.
The New Act has made material changes to corporate law and procedures. It prescribes
thirty-three new definitions. 4 It also empowers the Central Government to regulate the
formation, financing, functioning, and winding up of companies and to inspect a com-
pany's accounting books, to direct special audit, to investigate companies, and to launch
prosecutions for violations of the New Act.' The New Act makes meaningfil changes in
relation to corporate governance of the companies through corporate social responsibility,
increased director accountability, ensuring more powers to the Serious Fraud Investiga-
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Managing Partner, Mithras Law Group (Westborough, Massachusetts), and Richa Naujoks, Co-head South
Asia Practice, Nixon Peabody (New York, New York); Section II was authored by Aseem Chawla, Partner,
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1. For developments in 2012, see Hanishi T. Mi et al., ILdia, 47 INT'L LAW. 597 (2013).
2. See The Companies Bill, No. 121-C of 2011 (India), avaziahie at http://www.mca.gov.in/Minstry/pdf/
TheCompaniesBill2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
3. See The Companies Act, No. 1 of 1956, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
4. The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, § 2, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India), available at http://in-
diacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/182013.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
5. Id.
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tion Office, introduction of class action suits, and establishment of special courts for
speedy trials. 6 Some of the key highlights of the New Act are as follows:
A. INCORPORATION OF A COMPANY AND MATTERS INCIDENTAL
* Section 2 of the New Act allows a private company to have a maximum of 200
members, up from fifty in the 1956 Act.7
* Section 3 of the New Act introduces the concept of the One Person Company
(OPC), to provide more flexibility and to relax governance and reporting
requirements.8
* The New Act allows one person to form a Private Limited Company by subscribing
his or her name to the Memorandum of the Company and after complying with
other specified registration requirements. 9 In addition, the New Act provides that
the words "One Person Company" or "OPC" must be mentioned below the name
of the company.'0 In an OPC, the individual member is deemed to be the first
director until another director is appointed."
* In addition, the New Act requires that the Memorandum of an OPC must indicate
the name of another as a nominee-with the nominee's prior written consent-in
case of the subscriber's death or incapacity to contract.'2 That nomination is to be
filed at the time of incorporation along with the Memorandum and the Articles.'3
The nominee is also allowed to withdraw consent.' 4
* All companies must follow the uniform financial year, running from April to
March.' Exceptions can be made only in limited cases with approval of an indepen-
dent tribunal called the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). NCLT replaced
the Company Law Board and assumed the responsibility of the High Court as the
sanctioning authority with respect to Restructuring. An OPC is also required to file
a copy of the financial statements adopted by its member, along with relevant docu-
ments, within 180 days from the closure of the financial year.
B. DIRECTORS
* The New Act increased the maximum number of directors from twelve to fifteen
and requires every company to have at least one resident Indian director who has
resided in India for a period of no fewer than 182 days in the previous calendar
year.16
6. Id.
7. Id. § 2(68)(ii).
8. Id. § 3(1).
9. Id. § 3.
10. Id. § 12(3).
11. Id. § 152(1).
12. Id. § 3(1).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. § 2(41).
16. Id. § 149.
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* Prescribed class or classes of companies are now required to appoint at least one
woman director. 7
* To increase transparency and to safeguard the interest of the stakeholders, the con-
cept of Independent Directors (IDs) has been introduced.S At least one-third of
the total number of directors of every public listed company should be IDs.
* An ID's appointment must be approved by the company during a general meeting
and an explanatory statement must be annexed.19 A specific code and duties for IDs
has been prescribed by the New Act, which include guidelines for professional con-
duct, roles and functions, duties, manner of appointment, reappointment, resigna-
tion or removal, separate meetings, and an evaluation mechanism.
* IDs can hold office for a term of up to five consecutive years on the board of a
company but shall be eligible for reappointment upon passing of a special resolution
by the company and upon the disclosure of such appointment in the Board's
Report.20
* No ID shall hold office for more than two consecutive terms in one company but
the ID is eligible for re-appointment after a three-year period where the individual
has not been an ID.2 1
* An ID's liability is limited and he or she is liable only for such acts or omissions by a
company that occurred with his or her knowledge, and with consent, connivance, or
through lack of diligence.22
C. CORPORATE SOcIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
* The New Act introduces a new initiative of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. It
mandates every company having a net worth of rupees 500 crore or more, or turno-
ver of rupees one thousand crore or more, or a net profit of rupees five crore or
more during any financial year to constitute a Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) Committee of the Board consisting of three or more directors, out of which
at least one director shall be an ID.23
* The CSR Committee must formulate and recommend to the Board of Directors the
CSR policy of the company, the expenditures to be incurred on such activities, and a
plan for monitoring the company's CSR activities. 2 4
* The board in turn must ensure that the company spends, in every financial year, at
least 2 percent of the average net profits of the company made during three financial
years immediately preceding.25 If the company fails to spend the amount, the board
must specify the reasons for not doing so. 2 6
17. Id.
18. Id.
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* The specific activities that could be regarded as CSR are specified in Schedule VII
of the New Act.2
7
D. SERIOUS FRAUD INVESTIGATION OFFICE (SFIO)
* Section 211 of the New Act empowers the Central Government to establish the
Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) to investigate frauds relating to a com-
pany. The SFIO is headed by a director and comprises such number of experts as
may be appointed by the Central Government. 28 Statutory status has been con-
ferred upon SFIO.29
* The New Act empowers SFIO to make arrests for certain offenses, including fraud.
Reports filed by SFIO to the relevant court shall be treated as a report filed by a
police officer.30
* In the event that SFIO is investigating an offense under the New Act, other state
agencies, police, or income tax authorities that have any information or documents
shall provide all such information and documents to SFIO.31
E. CLASS ACTION SUITS
* Section 245 of the New Act also introduces the vehicle of the class action as a mech-
anism to protect small investors and allow them to sue as a group. 32 Members,
depositors, or their representatives have been empowered to file an application
before NCLT if they are of the opinion that the management or the conduct of the
affairs of the company is being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of
the company or its members or depositors. 33
* The most important part of such a class action is that prescribed members can claim
damages or compensation against the company, directors, auditors, experts, and ad-
visors for wrongful conduct. 34
F. AUDIT AND AUDITORS
* Chapter X, Sections 139-148 of the New Act make major changes in the appoint-
ment procedure and tenure of appointment for auditors. 35 These sections ensure
the independence of audit partners and the mandatory rotation of auditors. 36 The
ratification of auditor appointments by the members at every annual general meet-
ing of the company is now mandatory. 37





32. Id. § 245.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. ch. X, § 139-48.
36. See id. § 139.
37. Id.
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* More stringent laws have been enacted for listed companies so that no listed com-
pany may (a) appoint an individual as auditor for more than one term of five consec-
utive years or (b) appoint an audit firm as auditor for more than two terms of five
consecutive years. 38
* Members of the company have been empowered to decide by resolution whether
the auditing partner and his or her team will be rotated every year or whether more
than one auditor will conduct the audit.3 9
G. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT
* The New Act contains certain revisions relating to mergers, amalgamations and
compromises, and arrangements. 40 The New Act has not, as practitioners had
hoped, completely done away with the requirement in the 1956 Act for court ap-
proval of arrangements and related mergers.4 1 Nevertheless, instead of making an
application to the appropriate High Court, a company or its creditors/members or
any class of creditors/members seeking to enter into such a transaction are now
required to apply to the newly-created NCLT.42 Under the New Act, as under the
1956 Act, the NCLT may order a meeting of creditors/members prior to approving
the compromise.4 3 The constituent companies to such a transaction are now re-
quired to send the notice of the transaction to the Securities Exchange Board of
India (SEBI), the income tax authorities, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), and the Com-
petition Commission of India, any of which may object to the transaction. 44
Additionally, the New Act has introduced the following three welcome changes to the
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) regime:
* Cross-Border Mergers: The New Act permits the merger of a foreign company into
an Indian company, and also permits the merger of an Indian company into a for-
eign company. 45 RBI approval will be required for cross-border mergers.46
* Short Form Mergers: There is now a simplified process for mergers and amalgama-
tion between two "small companies" (defined as non-public companies with a less
than specified level of paid up capital or turnover) or between a holding company
and its wholly owned subsidiary.4 7 Instead of a court process, such companies are
required to notify the Registrar of Companies and Official Liquidators, which has
thirty days to raise any objections.48 Additionally, the transaction must be approved
by members holding 90 percent of the shares and a majority representing 9/10th in
value of the creditors/class of creditors. 49
38. Id. § 139(2)(a), (b).
39. Id. § 139(3)(a), (b).
40. Id. ch. XV.
41. Id. § 394.
42. Id. § 230.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 230(5).
45. Id. § 234. The Central Government has yet to provide this list of foreign countries, however.
46. Id. § 234(2).
47. Id. § 233(1).
48. Id. §§ 233(1)(a), 233(4).
49. Id. § 233(1)(b)-(d).
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Minority Squeeze-Out: Where a scheme or contract involving the transfer of shares
in a transferor company to a transferee company has, within four months after the
offer by the transferee company, been approved by the holders of not less than 9/
10th in value of the shares to be transferred, then the transferee company has the
ability within an additional two months to give notice to any dissenting minority
shareholders to acquire the shares of the dissenting shareholder.50 The dissenting
shareholder may apply to the NCLT to oppose the squeeze-out offer.SI If the
NCLT does not block the purchase, then one month after the offer by the transferee
company, it has the ability to require the transferor company to register the trans-
feree company as the holder of the shares.5 2 On the other hand, the New Act has
also introduced protections for minority shareholders-if a company acquires 90
percent of the issued share capital of another company, it must make an offer to
purchase the remaining shares at a price determined on the basis of valuation by a
registered valuer.5
3
H. RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
Under the New Act, board approval is required for a company to enter into any con-
tract or arrangement with a related party of the company.5 4 In a welcome change, there is
an exception for arm's length transactions entered into by the company in the ordinary
course of business.s"
I. PRIVATE PLACEMENT
The New Act provides for private placements by both public and private companies.
Private placement is described as an offer of securities or invitation to subscribe securities
through issue of a private placement offer letter to not more than fifty persons.5 6 Quali-
fied institutional buyers (QIBs) and employee-issued securities under an employee stock
option scheme are excluded from the count.5 7 An offer to a greater number will be treated
as a public offering and require compliance with applicable SEBI regulations.s8
The process for a private placement is as follows: prior to making the offer, the names
of the persons to whom offers are to be made will be recorded by the company, and only
persons whose names have been recorded may receive the offer5 9 Information about the
offer must be filed with the Registrar of Companies within thirty days of circulation of the
private placement offer letter.60 Securities must be issued within sixty days of receipt of
ftimds by the investors.6 1 The New Act restricts public solicitation through public adver-
50. Id. § 235(1).
51. Id. § 235(2).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 236.
54. Id. § 188.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 42(2).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 42(4).
59. Id. §§ 42(7), 42(9).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 42(6).
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tisements or utilization of media, marketing, distribution channels, or agents. 62 A com-
pany undertaking a private placement is also required to file a return of allotment with the
Registrar of Companies. 6 3
J. INSIDER TRADING
The New Act has specifically included the concept of "insider trading," which is defined
as directly or indirectly communicating any non-public price-sensitive information (i.e.,
information relating to a company, which, if published, is likely to materially affect the
price of securities of the company) by any director or key managerial personnel to any
person. 64 The New Act also prohibits buying, selling, or dealing in securities by any di-
rector, key managerial personnel, or any other officer of a company either as principal or
agent if such person is reasonably expected to have access to any non-public price sensitive
information in respect of securities of the company.6 Punishment for insider trading
includes imprisonment for up to five years and/or a fine of not less than five lakh rupees
(approximately $10,000) and up to twenty-five crore rupees (approximately $5,000,000) or
three times the amount of profits made out of insider trading, whichever is higher. 66
K. FRAUD
"Fraud" has been specifically defined in Section 447 of the New Act to include any,
act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person
or any other person with the connivance in any manner, with intent to deceive, to
gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the company or its share-
holders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain
or wrongful lOSS.6 7
Specific acts and omissions that will be punishable under Section 447 have also been
identified in various provisions of the New Act, such as knowingly or recklessly making
false, deceptive, or misleading statements; deliberately concealing material facts to induce
another person to purchase, sell, or under-write securities or making use of price fluctua-
tions; or obtaining credit from any bank or financial institution68 and in the case of audi-
tors, acting in a fraudulent manner or abetting or colluding in any fraud by or in relation
to the company. 69
Punishment for fraud is prescribed as imprisonment for not less than six months and up
to ten years and a fine in an amount not less than the amount involved in the fraud and up
to three times the amount involved in the fraud. 7 0Where the fraud involves "public inter-
62. Id. § 42(8).
63. Id. § 42(9).
64. Id. § 195(1).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 195(2).
67. Id. § 447.
68. Id. § 36.
69. Id. § 140(5).
70. Id. § 447.
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est," the term of imprisonment shall not be less than three years.7 1 Public interest is not
defined in the New Act, and it will be interesting to see the situations in which this provi-
sion will be used, if at all. Establishing a mandatory minimum penalty is a clear signal by
the government about the seriousness with which such offences will be treated.
II. Tax Policy Developments
As compared to the preceding year, 2013 has been more sublime for the development of
tax policies. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), the apex tax administration
body, made changes in direct tax that are perceived to be the Indian Government's effort
to bring about certainty in the Indian tax regime and to boost the foreign investor confi-
dence. The year 2013 witnessed a wide array of changes, including the introduction of
General Anti Avoidance Rules (GAAR); the inclusion of specified domestic transactions
within the ambit of transfer pricing; and the introduction of Safe Harbor rules to plug the
proliferation of transfer pricing litigation.
A. GAAR DEFERMENT AND DILUTION
GAAR, encapsulated in Chapter X-A of the Income Tax Act of 1961 (Act), was incorpo-
rated into the tax statue and was supposed to enter into effect on April 1, 2014. The
Government, however, deferred application of GAAR until April 1, 2016 via the Finance
Act of 2013, accepting the recommendation of the Shome Committee.72
To streamline the Tax Policies and Tax Laws in India with the global best practices and
to recommend measures for reforms, the Government recently constituted73 the Tax Ad-
ministration Reform Commission (TARC) under the chairmanship of Dr. Parthasarthi
Shome, who will work as an advisor to the Ministry of Finance. The work of the TARC is
expected to cover a wide range of issues in tax administration, including a review of the
existing mechanism of dispute resolution; recommended measures to strengthen the dis-
pute resolution mechanisms; methods to encourage voluntary tax compliance; and recom-
mended measures for deepening and widening of tax base and taxpayer base.74
The operative criterion for application of GAAR has been diluted. Amended Section
96 of the Act states that for an arrangement to be classified as an impermissible avoidance
arrangement, the "main purpose" of such arrangement should be to obtain tax benefits.71
71. Id.
72. Expert Committee on GAAR formed to undertake stakeholder consultation to finalize the guidelines
for GAAR, constituted under chairmanship of Dr. Parthasarthi Shome. See Final Report on General Anti
Avoidance Rules (GAAR) in Income-tax Act, 1961, EXPERT COMMITTEE T 1(i) (2012), available at http://
finmin.nic.in/reports/report-gaar itact 1961.pdf.
73. See Tax Administration Reform Commission (TARC), PRESS INFO. BUREAU GOVT OF INDIA (Oct. 21,
2013), http://finmin.nic.in/press-room/2013 /TARC21102013 .pdf
74. Id.
75. The Income Tax Act, No. 43 of 1961, § 96 INDIA CODE (2013), available at http://
www.incometaxindiapr.gov.in/incometaxindiacr/incometaxAct-index.jsp. The Income Tax Act, 1961, § 96
provides, "(1) An impermissible avoidance arrangement means an arrangement, the main purpose of which is
to obtain a tax benefit, and it-(a) creates rights, or obligations, which are not ordinarily created between
persons dealing at arm's length; (b) results, directly or indirectly, in the misuse, or abuse, of the provisions of
this Act; (c) lacks commercial substance or is deemed to lack commercial substance under section 97, in whole
or in part; or (d) is entered into, or carried out, by means, or in a manner, which are not ordinarily employed
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The GAAR rules76--issued by the CBDT--have recently provided some guidelines for
its application. The rules have prescribed a fiscal threshold of Indian National Rupees
(INR) 30,000,000 (INR Three Crores)77 for aggregate tax benefits accruing to all the
parties in the arrangement, under which GAAR shall not apply.78 Also, the rules regard-
ing income accruing or arising, or deemed to accrue or arise, to any person from transfer
of investments made before August 30, 2010, have been grandfathered in. In order to
provide certainty and respite to Foreign Institutional Investors (FIs), the GAAR rules
have kept FIs out of the purview of Chapter X-A (containing GAAR provisions subject to
certain conditions, among others, inability to avail of a treaty benefit).79 Furthermore, any
non-resident person investing directly or indirectly in a FI has also been excluded from
the GAAR.
B. TAx RESIDENCY CERTIFICATE (TRC)
It is also imperative to note that the requirement for obtaining a tax residency certificate
(TRC) to claim a treaty benefit mandated under Section 90(4) of the Act has now been
eased by insertion of Section 90(5),80 which clarifies that any other documentation and
information as may be prescribed could be provided by the assesse to claim a treaty
benefit.
C. LOWER WITHHOLDING OF TAXES FOR FI~s
The FIs-friendly nature of the Act is also highlighted by incorporation of Section
194LD, which provides for deduction of tax at lower rate of 5 percent for FIs and Quali-
fied Institutional Investors (QIT) on interest income from rupee denominated bonds of an
Indian Company or Government Security earned between June 1, 2013, and June 1,
2015.81
D. TRANSFER PRICING
After April 1, 2013, transfer-pricing provisions under Chapter X of the Act have also
been made applicable to Specified Domestic Transactions (SDTs).8 2 The accountant's re-
for bona fide purposes. (2) An arrangement shall be presulmed, unless it is proved to the contrary by the
assessee, to have been entered into, or carried out, for the main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, if the main
purpose of a step in, or a part of, the arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit, notwithstanding the fact that the
main purpose of the whole arrangement is not to obtain a tax benefit."
76. See generally Notification No. 75/2013, DIGEST OF CBDT NOTIFICATIONS & CIRCULARS (Sept. 9,
2013), http://182.18.132.100:8088/cbdtforprsite/fileopen.aspx?page=cirnmo&id=2013092300007520&path=
% 5Cnotifications% 5Ccbdtlaws% 5Chtmlfiles% 5Cnotification75 % E2 %80%A6.
77. INR 3 crores is equivalent to USD $483,030 based on the approximate present exchange rates (USD $1
INR 62). See XE Currency Converter, XI (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/
?Amount= 1&From=USD&To=INR (INR 3 crores is equivalent to U.S. $483,030 based on the approximate
present exchange rates USD $1 = INR 62).
78. Notification No. 75/2013, supra note 76, T 2(a)
79. Id. T 2(b).
80. The Income Tax Act, No. 43 of 1961, § 90 INDIA CODE (2013).
81. Id. § 194LD.
82. See Tax Relief for "Specified Associations" n Respect of Income Earned Outside India When Such Income is
Earned in a Country Where Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement "Exists Between India & Such Country," Ex
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port detailed in Form 3CEB under Rule 10E has been amended to require additional
disclosures on international transactions and also SDTs.
83
In an attempt to bring certainty to transfer pricing as well as to reduce transfer-pricing
disputes, CBDT released Safe Harbor Rules s 4 under which the department shall accept
the price declared by the assesse. Under the now-enacted safe harbor regime, the taxpay-
ers would follow a simple set of rules/margins under which transfer prices as such would
be accepted by the Income Tax authorities. The practice of using voluminous documenta-
tion--a holdover from the earlier requirements--is still, however, frequently used.
In conclusion, the tax landscape in India has witnessed some unprecedented occurrences
in the recent past. Both the tax administration and the policy makers have taken active
cognizance of the same developments, though the current macroeconomic situation does
not suggest an immediate easing. The tax administration believes that if a fine balancing
act were to be adopted, then to a large extent, the woes of the investor community, and in
particular those of multinational enterprises, would at least be acknowledged, if not re-
dressed completely. With the upcoming elections in the next year, it is widely believed
that because tax is a federal subject, the new central government will certainly have the
advantage of assimilating the gaps and shortcomings in the light of the Direct Tax Code,
the proposed new tax legislation.
III. International Arbitration and the Recent Supreme Court Ruling in
Bbarat Aluminum Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services Inc.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) contains two distinct parts dealing with
arbitration. Part I provides a framework of rules for disputes, both domestic and those
with an international element but where the seat of arbitration is in India. Part I confers
significant powers on the Indian courts to order interim measures, appoint and replace
arbitrators, and hear challenges to arbitral awards. Part II restricts the scope of judicial
intervention and deals with recognition of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards ren-
dered in a foreign seat and also incorporates the New York and Geneva Conventions.
Section 9 of Part I empowers Indian courts to grant interim relief to an Indian-seated
arbitration. But in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., 5 the Supreme Court held
that Indian courts could exercise the powers conferred on them by Part I of the Act even
in cases where the seat of the arbitration was outside India, unless Part I was excluded by
the parties to the arbitration agreement, either expressly or by necessary implication. The
Court reasoned that the parties would be left without any remedy if no interim relief was
granted in international commercial arbitrations that take place outside India, even
though the properties and assets are situated in India. The ruling in Bhatia International
considerably extended the scope of potential interference by Indian courts in international
PLORE INComE TAx (2013), http://www.exploreincometax.com/Indian-Income-tax-Act-1961/Section-90A
(last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
83. Rules on Taxation of Domestic and International Transactions Amended, INT'L L. OFF. (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=ffb60bb0-075a-4ffa-9bfl-790a02058d0d.
84. Indian Tax Administration Issues Final Rules on Transfer Pricing Safe Garbor, ERNST & YOUNG LLP (Sept.
19, 2013), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/TP-Indian Tax Admin issues final TP safe har-
bor rules/$FILE/TP Indian Tax Admin issues final TP safe harbor rules.pdf.
85. Bhatia Int'l v. Bulk Trading S.A. & Another, (2002) 4 S.C.C 105, T 25 (India).
VOL. 48
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
INDIA 613
arbitrations and also cast a shadow of uncertainty over internationally-seated arbitrations
involving Indian parties.
The rationale in Bhatia International was also applied in Venture Global Engineering LLC
v. Satyam Computers Services Ltd.,86 wherein the Supreme Court went one step further and
stated that whole of Part I would apply in case of international commercial arbitration. It
permitted the Indian courts to reopen and set aside awards rendered in arbitrations seated
outside India.
The rulings in Bhatia International and Venture Global were subjected to intense criticism
in India as well as abroad for authorizing Indian courts to exercise excessive jurisdiction
and for introducing substantial uncertainty in offshore arbitrations involving Indian
parties.
It is in this context that the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium Co. (BALCO) v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (Kaiser)8 7 decided to review and overrule its previous de-
cision in Bhatia International. On September 6, 2012, a specially constituted five-member
bench of the Supreme Court in its landmark decision overturned a decade-old line of
precedents that had controversially given the Indian courts disproportionate jurisdiction
to intervene in arbitrations seated outside India.
BALCO and Kaiser (the Parties) executed an agreement dated April 22, 1993, under
which Kaiser was to supply and install computer-based systems for Shelter Modernization
at BALCO's premises. Under the agreement's arbitration clause, any dispute or claim was
to be settled amicably by negotiation, failing which, the same would be settled by arbitra-
tion pursuant to the English Arbitration Laws and subsequent amendments thereto. Both
the Parties had the right to appoint one arbitrator each and the arbitration would be held
wholly in London, England. The prevailing law of India governed the Agreement even
though the arbitration was to be governed by English law. Accordingly, when a dispute
arose between the parties that could not be resolved by negotiation, it was referred to
arbitration in England. The arbitral tribunal's decisions were later challenged in India's
district court of Bilaspur under Section 34 of the Act. The district court and the High
Court of Chhattisgarh rejected the appeals. Therefore, BALCO filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court.88
The court held that Part I deals with domestic arbitration and Part II deals with inter-
national commercial arbitration and there can be no overlap between Part I and Part II of
the Act. Part I, therefore, has no application in the case of international commercial arbi-
trations seated outside India.8 9
The court also held that Section 9 of Part I, which grants the courts inherent powers to
grant interim relief in case of arbitration cannot be extended to international commercial
arbitrations seated outside India, because Part I applies only to arbitrations seated in
India. 90
Further, the court held that the power to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34
again falls under Part I of the Act and would apply only if the seat of arbitration is in India.
86. Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. & Another, (2008) 4 S.C.C. 190, T 32
(India).
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The court observed that awards passed in non-convention countries cannot be incorpo-
rated into the Act by way of interpretation and could only be done by suitable amend-
ments made to the Act by the Parliament.91
Under the Supreme Court's ruling, the seat of arbitration would be that provided for in
the arbitration agreement. The venue of the arbitration may be elsewhere and may
change as per the convenience of the parties but it will have no bearing on the seat of
arbitration. It is the seat of arbitration that will decide the applicable law governing the
arbitration proceedings. Accordingly, even when the Act is the curial law governing the
arbitration but the seat of arbitration is outside India, provisions of Part I of the Act would
not be applicable to the extent they are inconsistent with the arbitration law of the seat.92
The judgment has, therefore, clarified several legal anomalies that had tarnished the
image of Indian arbitration regime and judicial system. But the law declared in BALCO
will apply only to arbitration agreements made after September 6, 2012. This timeline
has led to more confusion as any arbitration agreement executed before this date will have
to follow the rules applied in Bhatia International and Venture Global, leading to two con-
flicting sets of jurisprudence.
IV. LGBT Rights and the Naz Foundation Judgment Review: SK Koushal
& Anr V Naz Foundation & Ors93
In a landmark judgment, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the sodomy law in Sec-
tion 377 of the Indian Penal Code did not violate the Indian Constitution. 94 The Su-
preme Court held that the separation of powers shifted the burden of constitutionality of
Section 377 to the Parliament. 9 1 The Delhi High Court had previously declared, in 2009,
that Section 377 violated Articles 21, 14, and 15 of the Constitution of India. 96
The Naz Foundation argued that Section 377 harmed peoples' lives and impeded public
health due to its direct impact on the lives of gay persons, that the section served as a
weapon for police abuse, and that the section perpetuated negative and discriminatory
beliefs towards same-sex relations and sexual minorities in general. 97 The sodomy law
drives gay men, males having sex with males (MSM), and other sexual minorities under-
ground, a result that cripples HIV/AIDS prevention methods. 98
Another argument made against Section 377 was that it creates a classification between
"natural" (penile-vaginal) and "unnatural" (penile-non-vaginal) penetrative sexual acts. 99
The legislative objective "of penalising unnatural acts has no rational nexus with the classi-
fication between natural (procreative) and unnatural (non-procreative) sexual acts and is
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Suresh Kumar Koushal & Another v. Naz Foundation & Others, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013
(arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 15436 of 2009) (Supreme Court of India, Dec. 11, 2013), availahie at http://
judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgsl.aspx?filename=41070.
94. Id. T 56; see also INDIA CONST. art. 21, available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1199182/.
95. Suresh KnmarKoushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 56; see also INDIA CONST. art. 13, available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/134715/.
96. Suresh Kumar Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, 2.
97. Id. T 3(ii).
98. Id.
99. Id. T 3(iv).
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thus violates Article 14."100 "The criminalization of homosexuality condemns, in
perpetuity, a sizable section of society and forces them to live their lives in the shadow of
harassment, exploitation, humiliation, and cruel and degrading treatment at the hands of
the law enforcement machinery."101 The Delhi High Court borrowed the language of the
South African Constitution and held that these individuals are denied "moral fill citizen-
ship."102 The Supreme Court, however, was not of the same opinion. The Supreme
Court reasoned that Section 377 applied irrespective of age and consent.0 3 The Supreme
Court denied that Section 377 criminalizes "a particular people or identity or orienta-
tion."10 4 The Court concluded that Section 377 "merely identifies certain acts which if
committed would constitute an offence."105 "Such a prohibition regulates sexual conduct
regardless of gender identity and orientation."106
The Supreme Court further held that the Naz Foundation failed to furnish the particu-
lars of the incidents of discriminatory attitude exhibited by the state agencies towards
sexual minorities and also failed to furnish the particulars of the cases involving harass-
ment and assault from public and public authorities to sexual minorities. 1 7 The affidavit
filed before the court on behalf of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Depart-
ment of AIDS Control, had averred that estimated HIV prevalence among FSW (female
sex workers) is 4.60 to 4.94 percent; among MSM is 6.54 to 7.23 percent; and among IDU
(injecting drug users) is 9.42 to 10.30 percent. 08 The total population of MSM in 2006
was estimated to be 2.5 million, and 10 percent of them are at risk of HIV.10 9 According
to the Court, however, "[t]hese details [were] wholly insufficient for a finding that homo-
sexuals, gays, etc., are being subjected to discriminatory treatment either by the State or
its agencies or the society."" 0
In a very narrow approach, the court held "that a miniscule fraction of the country's
population constitute lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgenders and in the last 150 years
less than 200 persons have been prosecuted (as per the reported orders) for committing
offence[s] under Section 377."' According to the court, "this cannot be made a sound
basis for declaring that section ultra vires the provisions of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the
Constitution."112
While examining the question of whether a particular classification is unconstitutional,
the Court relied upon the test prescribed by the case In Re: Special Courts Bill,"3 which
provides that, in order to pass the test of equality, two conditions must be fulfilled: "(1)
that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. T 3(iv).








111. Id. T 43.
112. Id.
113. In re: Special Courts Bill, .. .v. Unknown, (1979) 1 S.C.C. 380 (India).
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those that are grouped together from others and (2) that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act." 114 In the Court's words, "[tlhose
who indulge in carnal intercourse in the ordinary course and those who indulge in carnal
intercourse against the order of nature constitute different classes and the people falling in
the latter category cannot claim that Section 377 suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and
irrational classification."" '
Advocates argued that Section 377 violates Article 15 of the Constitution by discrimi-
nating on the ground of sexual orientation because, although facially neutral, it imposes an
unequal burden on gay men.
11 6
Though facially neutral, [Section 377] predominantly outlaws sexual activity between
men which is by its very nature penile non vaginal. While heterosexual persons in-
dulge in oral and anal sex, their conduct does not attract scrutiny except when the
woman is underage or unwilling. In fact, courts have even excluded married hetero-
sexual couples from the ambit of Section 377.117
The general aim of Article 15 is to prohibit discrimination on the enumerated
grounds.11s Article 15(3) uses the expression "women." But advocates argued that Article
15(3) must not be allowed to limit the understanding of Article 15(1) and reduce it to a
binary norm of man and woman only.11 9 "This becomes clear when Article 15(2) is ap-
plied to transgendered persons who identify as a third gender."120 The Delhi High Court
had supported its finding of a violation of Article 15 by relying on the foreign judgments,
for example Lawrence v. Texas121 and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality,
Dhirendra Nadan v. State.122
It was also contended that "[c]ourts in other countries have struck down similar laws
that criminalise same-sex sexual conduct on the ground that they violate the right to pri-
vacy, dignity, and equality."123 On the question of whether morality can be a ground for
imposing restriction on fundamental rights, the Delhi High Court referred to the judg-
ments in Lawrence v. Texas, 124 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,125 Norris v. Republic of Ireland,126
114. Id. at T 7.
115. Suresh Kumar Koushal & Another v. Naz Foundation & Others, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 42
(arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 15436 of 2009) (Supreme Court of India, Dec. 11, 2013), available at http://
judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgsl.aspx?filename=41070.
116. Id. T 19.19.
117. Id.
118. Id. T 19.19
119. Id.
120. Suresh Kumar Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 19.19.
121. Id. T 19.18; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
122. Suresh Kumar Koushal & Another v. Naz Foundation & Others, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013,
19.18 (arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 15436 of 2009) (Supreme Court of India, Dec. 11, 2013), available at http:/
/judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgsl.aspx?filename=41070; see also McCoskar v. The State, [2005] FJHC (Crim)
500 (Fiji).
123. Suresh Kumar Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 19.19
124. Id. T 10; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
125. Suresh KnmarKoushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 10; see also Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom,
App. No. 7525/76, [1981] ECHR 5 (1981).
126. Suresh Kumar Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 10; see also Case of Norris v. Ireland, App.
No. 10581/83 [1988] ECHR 22 (1988).
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National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister ofjustice, 2 7 and the opinion of
Justice Michael Kirby, former Judge of the Australian High Court and observed,
Thus popular morality or public disapproval of certain acts is not a valid justification
for restriction of the findamental rights under Article 21. Popular morality, as dis-
tinct from a constitutional morality derived from constitutional values, is based on
shifting and subjecting notions of right and wrong. If there is any type of "morality"
that can pass the test of compelling state interest, it must be "constitutional" morality
and not public morality ....
In our scheme of things, constitutional morality must outweigh the argument of pub-
lic morality, even if it be the majoritarian view. In Indian context, the latest report
(172nd) of Law Commission on the subject instead shows heightened realization
about urgent need to follow global trends on the issue of sexual offences. In fact, the
admitted case of Union of India that Section 377 IPC has generally been used in cases
of sexual abuse or child abuse, and conversely that it has hardly ever been used in
cases of consenting adults, shows that criminalization of adult same-sex conduct does
not serve any public interest. The compelling state interest rather demands that pub-
lic health measures are strengthened by de-criminalization of such activity, so that
they can be identified and better focused upon.'
28
But the Supreme Court discarded the rationale of the High Court and declared that the
High Court could not apply the judgments of foreign jurisdictions in deciding the consti-
tutionality of a law enacted by the Indian legislature.129 The Supreme Court also refised
to rely on the provision laid down by Halsbury's Laws of England, reasoning that state-
ments of law applicable to foreign countries, cited without making a critical examination,
are often inapposite in India.' 30
On several occasions, merely because courts in foreign countries have taken a differ-
ent view than that taken by our courts or in adjudicating on any particular matter we
were asked to reconsider those decisions or to consider them for the first time and to
adopt them as the law of this country .... While we should seek light from whatever
source we can get, we should however guard against being blinded by it.
The court then dealt with the issue of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The
requirement of substantive due process has been read into the Indian Constitution
through Articles 14, 21, and 19. "[A] provision which purports to restrict or limit the
right to life and liberty, including the rights of privacy, dignity, and autonomy, as envis-
aged under Article 2 1" will be tested to ensure that it is not only "competently legislated
but also be just, fair and reasonable."' 131 The court relied on Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
127. Suresh Kumar Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 10; see also National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality and others v. Minister of Justice and others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Aft.).
128. Suresh Kumar Koushal & Another v. Naz Foundation & Others, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 10
(arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 15436 of 2009) (Supreme Court of India, Dec. 11, 2013), available at http://
judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgsl.aspx?filename=41070; see also McCoskar v. The State, [2005] FJHC (Crim)
500 (Fiji).
129. Id. T 52.
130. Id. T 53.
131. Suresh Kumar Kushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 45.
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India'3 2 for the same. But the court held that even though Section 377 has been used to
perpetrate harassment, blackmail, and torture on certain persons, especially those belong-
ing to the LGBT community, this treatment is neither mandated by the section nor con-
doned by it. The court reasoned that the mere fact that police authorities and others
misuse the law is not a reflection of its legality.133 The police misuse of Section 377 may,
however, be a relevant factor for the Legislature to consider while judging the desirability
of amending it.
Section 377 does not take into account the differences in individuals in terms of their
sexual orientation and makes criminal the sexual practices relevant to, and associated with,
a class of homosexual persons. It criminalizes acts that are normal sexual expressions for
gay men. Distinctions based on a prohibited ground cannot be allowed regardless of how
laudable the object is. If a law operates to discriminate against some persons only on the
basis of a prohibited ground, it must be struck down.
132. Id.; see aso Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 248 (India).
133. Suresh Kumar Kousbal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013, T 51; see aso Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 6
S.C.C. 281 (India).
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